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Abstract
We describe timed observational transition systems (TOTSs). TOTSs are written in terms of equations. By regarding equations
as left-to-right rewrite rules, rewriting, together with induction and/or case analysis, can be used to verify that timing properties
hold for TOTSs. Concretely, CafeOBJ, an algebraic specification language, is used to specify TOTSs and verify that TOTSs have
timing properties by writing proofs, or proof scores. Two case studies are used to demonstrate how to model real-time systems
based on TOTSs, specify TOTSs in CafeOBJ and verify that TOTSs have timing properties with the CafeOBJ system.
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1. Introduction
Although equations are the most fundamental logical formulas and relatively easy to learn and use, they are
powerful enough to specify a wide variety of software and hardware systems because equations can be used to specify
abstract machines in terms of hidden algebras [1,2] as well as abstract data types in terms of order-sorted algebras [3].
In addition, by regarding equations as left-to-right rewrite rules, rewriting, together with case analysis, induction
and/or coinduction, can be used to verify that desired properties hold for a specification that is a set of equations.
Our method, called the OTS/CafeOBJ method [4], follows this approach based on equations, which has been mainly
advocated by researchers in the OBJ community [5]. A brief description of the way to model and verify the behavior
of a system is as follows. A formal model of the system is made as an OTS (observational transition system), which is
a transition system that can be straightforwardly written in terms of equations. The OTS is written in CafeOBJ [6], an
algebraic specification language mainly based on order-sorted algebras and hidden algebras. Proofs that the OTS has
properties are written in CafeOBJ, and the proofs are checked by means of rewriting with the CafeOBJ system [7].
An OTS consists of a set of observers, the set of initial states and a set of conditional transitions. Observers basically
take a state as argument and returns a value that characterizes the state. Observers correspond to variables in the usual
transition system definition. By introducing observers (called clock observers, or clocks) that return real numbers,
OTSs can be used as models of real-time systems. Such OTSs are called timed observational transition systems, or
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TOTSs. In this paper, we describe TOTSs and use two case studies to demonstrate that equations can be used to specify
real-time systems modeled as TOTSs.
Proofs written in OBJ languages such as OBJ3 [8] and CafeOBJ are often called proof scores. Proof scores can be
regarded as programs to show that desired properties hold for a specification. While proof scores are being designed,
constructed and debugged, we can understand specifications being analyzed more profoundly, which may even let
us find flaws lurked in the specifications [9,10]. The proof score approach to verification has some advantages such
that sophisticated knowledge on theorem proving is not required and proofs can be checked with rewriting that can
be efficiently implemented on computers. Our thought on proof is similar to that of the designers of LP [11]. In this
paper, we also demonstrate that the proof score approach can be applied to verification that real-time systems modeled
as TOTSs have timing properties.
We have proposed another model, called TBCM, for real-time systems [12]. TBCM originates in UNITY
computational models [13]. A TBCM consists of a set of (typed) variables, the initial condition and a set of transition
rules. A TBCM is defined as a traditional transition system, while TOTS is defined so that the behavioral specification
techniques in CafeOBJ can be effectively used. In addition, we have written in CafeOBJ only some key fragments
of proofs that real-time systems have properties in the method proposed in [12], while we write the entire proofs in
CafeOBJ in the method described in this paper. It is one of the advantages of OBJ languages such as CafeOBJ that an
OBJ language can be used in both the semi-formal method such as one proposed in [12] and the more formal method
such as one described in this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 mentions CafeOBJ. We describe TOTSs in Section 3 and
briefly write on how to specify and verify TOTSs in Section 4. Section 5 describes two case studies. We briefly
describe related work in Section 6 and conclude the paper with Section 7.
2. CafeOBJ
CafeOBJ1 [6] is mainly based on order-sorted algebras [3] and hidden algebras [1,2]. Abstract machines as well as
abstract data types can then be specified in CafeOBJ. There are two kinds of sorts in CafeOBJ: visible sorts and hidden
sorts. A visible sort denotes an abstract data type, while a hidden sort denotes the state space of an abstract machine.
There are three kinds of operators (or operations) with respect to hidden sorts: hidden constants, action operators
and observation operators. Hidden constants denote initial states of abstract machines, action operators denote state
transitions of abstract machines, and observation operators let us know the situation where abstract machines are
located. Both an action operator and an observation operator take a state of an abstract machine and zero or more data.
The action operator returns the successor state of the state with respect to the state transition denoted by the action
operator plus the data. The observation operator returns a value that characterizes the situation where the abstract
machine is located.
An example is used to describe part of CafeOBJ, which is needed in the rest of the paper. The example is a CafeOBJ
specification of a system in which a sender sends messages to a receiver via a network whose communication delay
is totally unpredictable, namely that although messages eventually arrive at their destinations, they are not guaranteed
to be delivered in the same order in which they are sent. The CafeOBJ specification consists of three (user-defined)
modules MSG, NETWORK and SYSTEM, where messages, networks and the behavior of the system are specified.
MSG is as follows:
mod* MSG {
[Msg]
op _=_ : Msg Msg -> Bool {comm}
var M : Msg
eq (M = M) = true .
}
The keyword mod* indicates that the module is a loose semantics declaration, meaning an arbitrary model (implemen-
tation) that respects all requirements written in the module. Visible sorts are declared by enclosing [ and ]. Msg is the
visible sort of messages. The keyword op or ops is used to declare (non-hidden) operators. The operator _=_ takes
two messages and is supposed to return true if the two messages are equal and false otherwise. An underscore _
1 See http://www.ldl.jaist.ac.jp/cafeobj/.
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indicates the place where an argument is put such as M = M. The keyword comm specifies that the operator _=_ is
commutative. Bool is the visible sort denoting truth values, declared in (precisely a parent module of) the built-in
module BOOL, which is automatically imported by almost every module unless otherwise stated. In BOOL and its
parent modules, declared are constants (operators with no arguments) true and false denoting true and false, and
operators denoting some basic logical connectives. Among the operators are not_, _and_, _or_, _xor_, _implies_
and _iff_ denoting negation (¬), conjunction (∧), disjunction (∨), exclusive disjunction (xor), implication (⇒) and
logical equivalence (⇔), respectively. The operator if_then_else_fi corresponding to the if construct in program-
ming languages is also declared. The keyword var or vars is used to declare variables. M is a variable of Msg. The
keyword eq is used to declare equations. The equation says that any message equals itself.
NETWORK is as follows:
mod! NETWORK {
pr(MSG)
[Msg < Network]
op void : -> Network
op _,_ : Network Network -> Network {assoc comm id: void}
op _-_ : Network Msg -> Network
op _\in_ : Msg Network -> Bool
var N : Network
vars M M’ : Msg
eq void - M = void .
eq (M , N) - M = N .
ceq (M’ , N) - M = M’ , (N - M) if not(M = M’) .
eq M \in void = false .
eq M \in (M , N) = true .
ceq M \in (M’ , N) = M \in N if not(M = M’) .
}
The keyword mod! indicates that the module is a tight semantics declaration, meaning the smallest model
(implementation) that respects all requirements written in the module. The keyword pr is used to import modules.
NETWORK imports MSG; note that NETWORK implicitly imports BOOL. The keyword < is used to specify order of sorts.
Msg is specified as a subsort of Network, meaning that a message is a network that consists of the message only. The
constant void denotes the empty network, the operator _,_ is the data constructor of nonempty networks, the operator
_-_ deletes a message from a network if there exists the message in the network, and the operator _\in_ checks if a
message is in a network. The keywords assoc, comm and id: specify that _,_ is associative, _,_ is commutative and
void is an identity of _,_. The keyword ceq is used to declare conditional equations; conditions are written after the
keyword if.
SYSTEM is as follows:
mod* SYSTEM {
pr(NETWORK)
*[Sys]*
op init : -> Sys
bop nw : Sys -> Network
bop snd : Sys Msg -> Sys
bop rec : Sys Msg -> Sys
var S : Sys
var M : Msg
eq nw(init) = void .
eq nw(snd(S,M)) = M , nw(S) .
ceq nw(rec(S,M)) = nw(S) - M if M \in nw(S) .
ceq nw(rec(S,M)) = nw(S) if not(M \in nw(S)) .
}
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Hidden sorts are declared by enclosing *[ and ]*. Sys is the hidden sort denoting the state space of the system being
specified. The constant init is a hidden constant denoting an initial state of the system. The keyword bop or bops is
used to declare action and observation operators. The operator nw is an observation operator, which is used to observe
the network in the system. The operators snd and rec are action operators; snd denotes the sender’s sending messages
and rec denotes the receiver’s receiving messages. The term snd(S,M) denotes the successor state of a state S after
the sender sends a message M in the state S and the term rec(S,M) denotes the successor state of a state S after the
receiver tries to receive a message M in the state S.
The CafeOBJ system [7] uses declared equations as left-to-right rewrite rules and rewrites (or reduces) a given
term. This functionality makes it possible to simulate specified systems and verify that specified systems have desired
properties. Let us make some simulations of the system specified in SYSTEM. The CafeOBJ script for the simulations
is as follows:
open SYSTEM
ops m1 m2 m3 : -> Msg .
eq (m1 = m2) = false .
eq (m1 = m3) = false .
eq (m2 = m3) = false .
ops s1 s2 s3 : -> Sys .
eq s1 = rec(snd(snd(init,m1),m2),m2) .
eq s2 = snd(rec(s1,m3),m3) .
eq s3 = rec(s2,m3) .
red nw(s1) .
red nw(s2) .
red nw(s3) .
close
The command open makes a temporary module that imports a given module and the command close destroys it. In
the script, declared are the three constants m1, m2 and m3 of Msg. The first three equations say that the three messages
are different from each other. The command red reduces a given term. The results of the three reductions in the script
are m1, ‘m3 , m1’ and m1, respectively.
BOOL plays an essential role in verification with the CafeOBJ system. If the equations available in the module are
regarded as left-to-right rewrite rules, they are complete with respect to propositional logic [14]. Therefore, any term
denoting a propositional formula that is always true (or false) is surely reduced to true (or false). More generally,
a term denoting a propositional formula is reduced to a term denoting an exclusively disjunctive normal form of the
propositional formula. Let us give some examples of reducing some logical formulas. The CafeOBJ script for the
examples is as follows:
open BOOL
ops p q r : -> Bool .
red (p implies q) and (q implies r) implies (p implies r) .
red p or q .
close
The results of the two reductions in the script are true and ‘q and p xor q xor p’, respectively.
3. Timed observational transition systems
Observational transition systems, OTSs, are transition systems that can be straightforwardly written in terms
of equations [4]. Timed observational transition systems, TOTSs, are OTSs that are evolved by introducing clock
observers in order to deal with timing.
We assume that there exists a universal state space denoted by Υ . We also suppose that each data type used has
been defined beforehand, including the equivalence between two values v1, v2 of the data type denoted by v1 = v2.
Let B, N and R+ be a set of truth values, a set of natural numbers and a set of non-negative real numbers, respectively.
166 K. Ogata, K. Futatsugi / Science of Computer Programming 66 (2007) 162–180
Definition 1 (TOTS). A TOTS S consists of 〈O, I, T ∪ {tickr | r ∈ R+}〉 where
• O : A set of observers. The set O = D ∪ C is classified into the set D of discrete observers and the set C of clock
observers. Clock observers may be called clocks. Each o ∈ O is a function o : Υ → D, where D is a data type and
may differ from observer to observer. Given two states υ1, υ2 ∈ Υ , the equivalence between two states, denoted
by υ1 =S υ2, with respect to S is defined as ∀o ∈ O.o(υ1) = o(υ2).
• I : The set of initial states such that I ⊆ Υ .
• T ∪{tickr | r ∈ R+} : A set of conditional transitions. Each τ ∈ T ∪{tickr | r ∈ R+} is a function τ : Υ → Υ such
that τ(υ1) =S τ(υ2) for each [υ] ∈ Υ/=S and each υ1, υ2 ∈ [υ]. τ(υ) is called the successor state of υ ∈ Υ with
respect to τ . The condition of τ is called the effective condition. Each τ is required to satisfy the requirement that
υ =S τ(υ) for each υ ∈ Υ such that the effective condition for τ is false in υ.
For each clock, D is a subset (subtype) of R+ ∪ {∞}. For each τ ∈ T , there are two clocks lτ : Υ → R+ and
uτ : Υ → (R+ \ {0}) ∪ {∞}, which return the lower and upper bounds of τ , respectively. They are basically used to
force τ to be executed, or applied between the lower bound returned by lτ and the upper bound returned by uτ . There
is also one special clock now : Υ → R+. It serves as the master clock and returns the time amount that has passed
after starting the execution of S. now initially returns 0. C contains the two clocks lτ and uτ for each τ ∈ T , and the
master clock now.
For each τ ∈ T , its effective condition consists of the timing part and the non-timing part. The non-timing part is
denoted by cτ . Given a state υ ∈ Υ , the timing effective condition is lτ (υ) ≤ now(υ).
Each tickr is a time advancing transition. Given a state υ ∈ Υ , for each tickr , its effective condition is
now(υ) + r ≤ uτ (υ) for each τ ∈ T , and now(tickr (υ)) is now(υ) + r if the effective condition of tickr is true
in υ. tickr does not affect the value returned by any observer except for now, and the value returned by now is only
affected by time advancing transitions. 
For each τ ∈ T , besides two clocks lτ and uτ , there are two functions dminτ and dmaxτ whose types are the same as lτ
and uτ , respectively. dminτ and d
max
τ give the minimum and maximum delays of τ , respectively, which are used as the
values returned by lτ and uτ . We describe how to define the initial values of lτ and uτ , and how to change the values
returned by lτ and uτ when τ ′ ∈ T is applied in a state where its effective condition holds.
• Let init denote an initial state of S:
lτ (init) =
{
dminτ (init) if cτ (init)
0 otherwise
uτ (init) =
{
dmaxτ (init) if cτ (init)
∞ otherwise.
• Suppose that τ ′ is applied in a state υ ∈ Υ such that cτ ′(υ) and lτ ′(υ) ≤ now(υ) and let υ ′ be τ ′(υ).
. If τ ′ is the same as τ :
lτ (υ ′) =
{
now(υ)+ dminτ (υ) if cτ (υ ′)
0 otherwise
uτ (υ ′) =
{
now(υ)+ dmaxτ (υ) if cτ (υ ′)
∞ otherwise.
. If τ ′ is different from τ :
lτ (υ ′) =
now(υ)+ d
min
τ (υ) if ¬cτ (υ) ∧ cτ (υ ′)
0 if cτ (υ) ∧ ¬cτ (υ ′)
lτ (υ) otherwise
uτ (υ ′) =
now(υ)+ d
max
τ (υ) if ¬cτ (υ) ∧ cτ (υ ′)
∞ if cτ (υ) ∧ ¬cτ (υ ′)
uτ (υ) otherwise.
If dxτ returns a constant value in any state υ, d
x
τ may be used to denote the constant value instead of d
x
τ (υ), where
x = min,max.
Definition 2 (Execution). An execution of S is an infinite sequence υ0, υ1, . . . , υi , . . . of states satisfying
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• Initiation: υ0 ∈ I,
• Consecution: For each i ∈ N , there exists τ ∈ T ∪ {tickr | r ∈ R+} such that υi+1 =S τ(υi ).
• Time Divergence: As i increases, now(υi ) increases without bound.
Let ES be the set of all executions obtained from S. 
From Definition 2, it is possible to have an execution υ0, . . . , υi , υi+1, . . . such that υi+1 is τ(υi ), cτ (υi ) is false and
hence υi+1 is υi . To exclude such an execution, we may modify Consecution such that for each i ∈ N , there exists
τ ∈ T ∪ {tickr | r ∈ R+} such that υi+1 =S τ(υi ) and cτ (υi ) is true. We, however, stick to Definition 2 because
the definition is more appropriate for formalization of TOTSs in CafeOBJ. As described in the forthcoming section,
a transition τ is denoted by an action operator a. Given a state υ, which is denoted by a term s, the term a(s) denotes
the successor state of υ with respect to τ regardless of the truth value of cτ (υ). It is cumbersome that the term a(s) is
well-formed only if cτ (υ) is true.
A state υ ∈ Υ appears in an execution υ0, υ1, . . . of S, denoted by υ ∈ υ0, υ1, . . . , if and only if there exists i ∈ N
such that υ =S υi .
Definition 3 (Reachable State). A state υ ∈ Υ is called reachable with respect to S if and only if there exists an
execution e ∈ ES such that υ ∈ e. LetRS be the set of all reachable states with respect to S. 
All properties considered in this paper are invariants.
Definition 4 (Invariant). A predicate p : Υ → B is called invariant with respect to S, denoted by invariantS p, if
and only if ∀υ ∈ RS .p(υ). S may be omitted from invariantS p if it is clear from context. 
Let x1, x2, . . . , whose data types are D1, D2, . . . , respectively, be all free variables appearing in invariantS p. We
suppose that invariantS p is interpreted as ∀x1 ∈ D1.∀x2 ∈ D2 . . . (invariantS p) in this paper. When a proof score
of this formula is written, the free variables are replaced with constants denoting arbitrary values and the universal
quantifiers are eliminated [3].
A TOTS is defined to be non-Zeno if any finite sequence of states generated by the TOTS can be extended to an
execution. A sufficient condition on which a TOTS S is non-Zeno is that for each τ ∈ T and each state υ ∈ Υ ,
lτ (υ) ≤ uτ (υ), namely that dminτ (υ) ≤ dmaxτ (υ) (from [15]). For each τ ∈ T , if dminτ always returns 0, lτ may be
omitted from O, and if dmaxτ always returns∞, uτ may be omitted from O.
Observers and transitions may be parameterized such as tickr . Observers and transitions are generally expressed
as oi1,...,im and τ j1,..., jn , respectively, provided that m, n ≥ 0 and there exists a data type Dk such that k ∈ Dk , where
k = i1, . . . , im, j1, . . . , jn .
4. Specification and verification of TOTSs
4.1. Writing TOTSs in CafeOBJ
A TOTS is written in CafeOBJ as an OTS [4]. For writing TOTSs in CafeOBJ, however, we prepare one module
called TIMEVAL where extended non-negative real numbers are specified. TIMEVAL is declared with mod*. The
signature of the module is as follows:
[Zero NzReal+ < Real+]
[NzReal+ Inf < NzTimeval]
[Real+ NzTimeval < Timeval]
op 0 : -> Zero
op oo : -> Inf
op _+_ : Real+ Real+ -> Real+ {assoc comm}
op _+_ : Timeval Timeval -> Timeval {assoc comm}
op _<_ : Timeval Timeval -> Bool
op _<=_ : Timeval Timeval -> Bool
op _=_ : Timeval Timeval -> Bool {comm}
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Zero, NzReal, Real+, Inf, NzTimeval and Timeval are visible sorts denoting {0}, R+ \ {0}, R+, {∞}, (R+ \ {0})∪
{∞} and R+ ∪ {∞}, respectively. Constants 0 and oo denote 0 and∞, respectively. Operator + adds two extended
non-negative real numbers, operator < checks if one extended non-negative real number is greater than the other,
operator <= checks if one extended non-negative real number is greater than or equal to the other and operator =
checks if two extended non-negative real numbers are equal.
The properties of the operators are specified in equations. The equations needed for the two case studies described
in this paper are as follows:
eq X < 0 = false .
eq X < oo = true .
eq oo < X = false .
eq X < X = false .
ceq T1 < T2 = false if T2 <= T1 .
ceq X + T1 < X + T2 = true if T1 < T2 .
ceq T < T1 + T2 = true if T < T2 .
eq 0 <= X = true .
eq X <= oo = true .
eq oo <= X = false .
eq X <= X = true .
eq X <= X + T = true .
ceq T1 + T2 <= T1 = false if 0 < T2 .
ceq T1 <= T2 = false if T2 < T1 .
where X and Y are CafeOBJ variables whose sorts are Real+ and T, T1 and T2 are CafeOBJ variables whose sorts are
Timeval.
Basically, we would like to have a module in which non-negative real numbers are specified so that real-time
systems can be specified. Since our primary purpose is to verify that real-time systems have (invariant) properties but
not to execute or simulate real-time systems, however, we do not necessarily have to have the complete specification
of non-negative real numbers. Hence, some properties of non-negative real numbers (plus ∞), which are needed to
verify that real-time systems have properties, are described in TIMEVAL. This is why the module is declared with
mod*. The current TIMEVAL has enough properties of non-negative real numbers to verify that some real-time systems
including two examples described in the coming section have some invariant properties. It is one piece of our future
work to extend TIMEVAL with additional properties of non-negative real numbers so that TIMEVAL can be applied to
verification of many real-time systems.
Given a data type Dk (or D), let Vk (or V) be a visible sort corresponding to the data type and let Xk (or X) be a
CafeOBJ variable whose sort is Vk (or V) in the rest of the section. The universal state spaceΥ is denoted by a hidden
sort, say H. An observer oi1,...,im ∈ O is denoted by a CafeOBJ observation operator. The CafeOBJ observation
operator denoting oi1,...,im is declared as follows:
bop o : H Vi1 . . . Vim -> V .
A state in I, namely an initial state, is denoted by a constant, say init, which is declared as follows:
op init : -> H.
Suppose that the initial value of oi1,...,im is f (i1, . . . , im). This is expressed by the following equation:
eq o(init,Xi1 , . . . ,Xim ) = f (Xi1 , . . . ,Xim ) .
f (Xi1 , . . . , Xim ) is a CafeOBJ term denoting f .
A transition τ j1,..., jn ∈ T ∪{tickr | r ∈ R+} is denoted by a CafeOBJ action operator. The CafeOBJ action operator
denoting τ j1,..., jn is declared as follows:
bop a : H V j1 . . . V jn -> H
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τ j1,..., jn may change the value returned by oi1,...,im if it is applied in a state where it is effective, which can be
written generally as follows:
ceq o(a(S,X j1 , . . . ,X jn ),Xi1 , . . . ,Xim ) = e− a(S,X j1 , . . . ,X jn ,Xi1 , . . . ,Xim ) if c− a(S,X j1 , . . . ,X jn ) .
S is a CafeOBJ variable whose sort is H. a(S,X j1 , . . . ,X jn ) denotes the successor state of S with respect
to τ j1,..., jn . e− a(S,X j1 , . . . ,X jn ,Xi1 , . . . ,Xim ) denotes the value returned by oi1,...,im in the successor state.
c− a(S,X j1 , . . . ,X jn ) denotes the effective condition of τ j1,..., jn .
τ j1,..., jn changes nothing if it is applied in a state where it is not effective, which can be written generally as follows:
ceq a(S,X j1 , . . . ,X jn ) = S if not c− a(S,X j1 , . . . ,X jn ) .
If the value returned by oi1,...,im is not affected by applying τ j1,..., jn in any state (regardless of the truth value of the
effective condition), the following equation may be declared:
eq o(a(S,X j1 , . . . ,X jn ),Xi1 , . . . ,Xim ) = o(S,Xi1 , . . . ,Xim ) .
4.2. Verification of invariants
We prove a predicate invariant to a TOTS as we prove a predicate invariant to an OTS [4]. Although some
invariant properties may be proved by rewriting and/or case analysis only, we often use induction as well, especially
simultaneous induction [4] on the number of transitions applied. We then describe how to verify invariantS p1 by
simultaneous induction on the number of transitions applied by writing proof scores in CafeOBJ based on the CafeOBJ
specification of S.
It is often impossible to prove invariantS p1 alone. We then suppose that it is possible to prove invariantS p1
together with n − 1 other predicates.2 Let the n − 1 other predicates be p2, . . . , pn . That is, we prove invariantS
(p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pn). Let xi1, . . . , ximi whose types are Di1, . . . , Dimi be all free variables in pi except for υ whose type
is Υ , where i = 1, . . . , n. pi may be written as pi (υ, xi1, . . . , ximi ), where i = 1, . . . , n, and p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pn may be
written as p or p(υ, x11, . . . , xnmn ).
Let init denote an arbitrary initial state of S. For the base case, all we have to do is to prove
pi (init, xi1, . . . , ximi ) (1)
for i = 1, . . . , n. We suppose that the free variables xi1, . . . , ximi are universally quantified. We also suppose that all
free variables in every formula are universally quantified in this subsection unless otherwise stated. (1) is logically
equivalent to p(init, x11, . . . , xnmn ).
For the inductive cases, for each τ j1,..., jm j ∈ T all we have to do is to prove
(SIHi ∧ pi (υ, xi1, . . . , ximi ))⇒ pi (τ j1,..., jm j (υ), xi1, . . . , ximi ) (2)
for i = 1, . . . , n. SIHi is used to strengthen the basic inductive hypothesis pi (υ, xi1, . . . , ximi ) and can be in the form
pα(υ, tα1, . . . , tαmα ) ∧ pβ(υ, tβ1, . . . , tβmβ ) ∧ . . . , where α, β, . . . ∈ {1, . . . , n} and each tι is an expression whose
type is Dι. From (2), we can deduce
(SIH1 ∧ · · · ∧ SIHn ∧ p(υ, x11, . . . , xnmn ))
⇒ p(τ j1,..., jm j (υ), x11, . . . , xnmn ).
The formula says that p holds in τ j1,..., jm j (υ) if p holds in υ, which corresponds to the inductive case where we show
that τ j1,..., jm j preserves p for the proof of invariantS p by induction on the number of transitions applied.
From what has been described, all we have to do is to show (1) and (2) in order to prove invariantS p. This means
that it is possible to write the proof of each invariantS pi independently, where i = 1, . . . , n. Since we prove multiple
predicates p1, . . . , pn invariant to S (virtually) simultaneously by induction, we call the proof method simultaneous
induction.
2 Generally such n − 1 predicates should be found while invariantS p1 is being proved.
170 K. Ogata, K. Futatsugi / Science of Computer Programming 66 (2007) 162–180
We next describe how to write proofs of (1) and (2) in CafeOBJ. We suppose that S is written in CafeOBJ as
described in Section 4.1.
We first declare the operators denoting p1, . . . , pn and the equations defining the operators. The operators and
equations are declared in a module, say INV (which imports the module where S is written), as follows:
op invi : H Vi1 . . .Vimi -> Bool
eq invi (S,Xi1, . . . ,Ximi ) = pi (S,Xi1, . . . ,Ximi ) .
for i = 1, . . . , n. pi (S,Xi1, . . . ,Ximi ) is a CafeOBJ term denoting pi . In the module INV, we also declare a constant
xk denoting an arbitrary value of Vk , where k = 11, . . . , nmn .
We then declare the operators denoting basic formulas to show in the inductive cases and the equations defining
the operators. The operators and equations are declared in a module, say ISTEP (which imports INV), as follows:
op istepi : Vi1 . . .Vimi -> Bool
eq istepi (Xi1, . . . ,Ximi ) = invi (s,Xi1, . . . ,Ximi ) implies invi (s′,Xi1, . . . ,Ximi ) .
for i = 1, . . . , n. s and s′ are constants of H. s denotes an arbitrary state and s′ denotes a successor state of the state.
The proof of (1), written in CafeOBJ, is like
open INV
red invi (init, xi1, . . . , ximi ) .
close
for i = 1, . . . , n. CafeOBJ scripts like this constitute proof scores. Such fragments of proof scores are called proof
passages in this paper.
The proof of (2) often needs case analysis. We suppose that the state space is split into l sub-spaces3 in order to
prove (2) and that each sub-space is characterized by a predicate caseik , where k = 1, . . . , l. The predicates should
satisfy (casei1 ∨ · · · ∨ caseil )⇔ true. Then the proof of (2) can be replaced with
(SIHi ∧ caseik ∧ pi (υ, xi1, . . . , ximi ))⇒ pi (τ j1,..., jm j (υ), xi1, . . . , ximi ) (3)
where i = 1, . . . , n and k = 1, . . . , l.
We suppose that τ j1,..., jm j is denoted by a CafeOBJ action operator a and the CafeOBJ term that denotes SIHi is
SIHi . Then the proof passage of (3) is like
open ISTEP
-- arbitrary objects
op y1m1 : − > V1m1 .· · ·
op y jm j : − > V jm j .
-- assumptions
Declaration of equations denoting caseik .
-- successor state
eq s′ = a(s, y j1 , . . . , y jm j ) .
-- check
red SIHi implies istepi (xi1, . . . , ximi ) .
close
for i = 1, . . . , n and k = 1, . . . , l. A comment starts with -- and terminates at the end of the line. The constants
y1m1 , . . . , y jm j denote arbitrary values of the corresponding visible sorts. The predicate caseik representing the
subcase is written in equations in the proof passage. SIHi implies istepi (xi1, . . . , ximi ) is logically equivalent to
(SIHi and invi (s,Xi1, . . . ,Ximi )) implies invi (s
′,Xi1, . . . ,Ximi ).
3 Generally such case analysis should be done while invariantS p1 is being proved.
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5. Case studies
Two case studies on an asynchronous data sending problem and Fischer’s protocol are described.
5.1. Asynchronous data sending
Let us consider an asynchronous data sending problem that can be described as follows:
A sender repeatedly sends natural numbers to a receiver one by one from zero in ascending order via a cell. The
sender puts a natural number into the cell and the receiver gets a natural number from the cell if the cell is not
empty.
The problem is first modeled as an OTS. Let B, N and L be data types of truth values, natural numbers and lists of
natural numbers, respectively. Four observers and two transitions are used, which are as follows:
• Observers.
. empty : Υ → B checks if the cell is empty. It initially returns true.
. content : Υ → N returns the natural number in the cell if any. It initially returns an arbitrary natural number.
. data : Υ → N returns the natural number that the sender will send next. It initially returns 0.
. list : Υ → L returns the list into which the receiver puts received natural numbers. It initially returns the empty
list.
• Transitions.
. send : Υ → Υ denotes that the sender puts a natural number in the cell. The non-timing effective condition is
always true.
. rec : Υ → Υ denotes that the receiver gets a natural number from the cell if any. The non-timing effective
condition is that the cell is not empty.
We next give timing constraints to the transitions so that no natural numbers sent by the sender are lost. If the
sender puts a natural number in the cell that is not empty, some natural numbers are lost. If the sender can check if the
cell is empty, a more straightforward solution can be used. We then suppose that the sender is not able to check if the
cell is empty.
Five clocks and the set of time advancing transitions are added to evolve the OTS into a TOTS. One of the clocks
is the master clock. The remaining are lsend, usend, lrec and urec. We also have four functions dminsend, d
max
send, d
min
rec and d
max
rec .
For any state υ ∈ Υ , these four functions satisfy the following:
dmaxsend(υ) = ∞,
dminrec (υ) = 0,
0 < dmaxrec (υ) < d
min
send(υ) <∞.
As mentioned, usend and lrec are omitted. We also suppose that dmaxrec always returns the same value and so does d
min
send.
The timing constraints propose that the receiver should get a natural number from the cell before the sender puts a
new natural number into the cell if the cell is not empty, or the sender should not put a new natural number into the
cell before the receiver gets a natural number from the cell if the cell is not empty.
The TOTS is written in CafeOBJ. The signature of the CafeOBJ specification is as follows:
*[Sys]*
-- an arbitrary initial state
op init : -> Sys
-- observation operators
bop empty : Sys -> Bool
bop content : Sys -> Nat
bop data : Sys -> Nat
bop list : Sys -> List
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bop now : Sys -> Real+
bop l : Sys -> Real+
bop u : Sys -> NzTimeval
-- action operators
bop send : Sys -> Sys
bop rec : Sys -> Sys
bop tick : Sys Real+ -> Sys
Sys is a hidden sort denoting the state space Υ . Nat and List are visible sorts denoting N and L , respectively. The
hidden constant init denotes an arbitrary initial state of the TOTS. l and u denote lsend and urec, respectively. The
remaining observation and action operators denote the observers and transitions whose names are very similar to those
of the observation and action operators.
The equations defining init are as follows:
eq empty(init) = true .
eq data(init) = 0 .
eq list(init) = nil .
eq now(init) = 0 .
eq l(init) = d1 .
eq u(init) = oo .
The constants nil and d1 denote the empty list and dminsend, respectively.
In the following, let S and D be CafeOBJ variables whose sorts are Sys and Real+, respectively. The equations
defining send are as follows:
ceq empty(send(S)) = false if l(S) <= now(S) .
ceq content(send(S)) = data(S) if l(S) <= now(S) .
ceq data(send(S)) = inc(data(S)) if l(S) <= now(S) .
eq list(send(S)) = list(S) .
eq now(send(S)) = now(S) .
ceq l(send(S)) = now(S) + d1 if l(S) <= now(S) .
ceq u(send(S)) = now(S) + d2 if l(S) <= now(S) .
ceq send(S) = S if not(l(S) <= now(S)) .
The operator inc increments a natural number and the constant d2 denotes dmaxrec .
The equations defining rec are as follows:
ceq empty(rec(S)) = true if not empty(S) .
eq content(rec(S)) = content(S) .
eq data(rec(S)) = data(S) .
ceq list(rec(S)) = put(list(S),content(S)) if not empty(S) .
eq now(rec(S)) = now(S) .
eq l(rec(S)) = l(S) .
ceq u(rec(S)) = oo if not empty(S) .
ceq rec(S) = S if empty(S) .
The operator put puts a natural number into a list at the end.
The equations defining tick are as follows:
eq empty(tick(S,D)) = empty(S) .
eq content(tick(S,D)) = content(S) .
eq data(tick(S,D)) = data(S) .
eq list(tick(S,D)) = list(S) .
ceq now(tick(S,D)) = now(S) + D if now(S) + D <= u(S) .
eq l(tick(S,D)) = l(S) .
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eq u(tick(S,D)) = u(S) .
ceq tick(S,D) = S if not(now(S) + D <= u(S)) .
We verify that no natural numbers sent by the sender are lost. To this end, all we have to do is to prove the following
predicate invariant to the TOTS:
empty(υ)⇒ list(υ) = [0..data(υ)− 1]
∧ ¬empty(υ)⇒ list(υ) = [0..data(υ)− 2], (4)
where [m..n] is a list of natural numbers from m to n both inclusive if m ≤ n and the empty list otherwise. To prove
(4) invariant to the TOTS, we need to prove the following predicates invariant to the TOTS:
lsend(υ) ≤ now(υ)⇒ empty(υ), (5)
¬empty(υ)⇒ 0 < data(υ), (6)
¬empty(υ)⇒ content(υ) = data(υ)− 1, (7)
¬empty(υ)⇒ urec(υ) < lsend(υ). (8)
The five predicates are proved invariant to the TOTS by simultaneous induction on the number of transitions applied
by writing proof scores in CafeOBJ.
Before writing proof scores, we first write a module, say INV, in which the five predicates are expressed as CafeOBJ
terms as follows:
op inv1 : Sys -> Bool
op inv2 : Sys -> Bool
op inv3 : Sys -> Bool
op inv4 : Sys -> Bool
op inv5 : Sys -> Bool
eq inv1(S)
= (empty(S) implies list(S) = (0 .. dec(data(S)))) and
(not empty(S) implies list(S) = (0 .. dec(dec(data(S))))) .
eq inv2(S) = l(S) <= now(S) implies empty(S) .
eq inv3(S) = not empty(S) implies 0 < data(S) .
eq inv4(S) = not empty(S) implies
content(S) = dec(data(S)) .
eq inv5(S) = not empty(S) implies u(S) < l(S) .
The operator dec decrements a natural number. dec(0) denotes any negative integer, dec(dec(0)) = dec(0) and
¬(0 ≤ dec(0)). (M .. N) denotes [m..n], where M and N denotes m and n, respectively.
We next write a module, say ISTEP, in which basic formulas to prove in each inductive case are expressed as
CafeOBJ terms as follows:
op istep1 : -> Bool
op istep2 : -> Bool
op istep3 : -> Bool
op istep4 : -> Bool
op istep5 : -> Bool
eq istep1 = inv1(s) implies inv1(s’) .
eq istep2 = inv2(s) implies inv2(s’) .
eq istep3 = inv3(s) implies inv3(s’) .
eq istep4 = inv4(s) implies inv4(s’) .
eq istep5 = inv4(s) implies inv4(s’) .
The constants s and s’ denote an arbitrary state and a successor state of the state. The constants are declared in ISTEP.
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We then write five proof scores of (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8). In this paper, we describe the inductive case in which
rec, which is denoted by rec, preserves (4). The state space, or the case is first split into two subcases: one where the
effective condition of rec holds and the other where it does not. Since rec does not change anything in a state in which
the effective condition does not hold, rec surely preserves (4). But it is worth writing the proof passage of the subcase
because we can partly check if the CafeOBJ specification is intentionally written. When the effective condition holds,
the case is also split into the four subcases characterized by the following four predicates:
(1) list(s) = (0 .. dec(dec(data(s)))) ∧ data(s)= 0,
(2) list(s) = (0 .. dec(dec(data(s)))) ∧ data(s) = succ(n)
∧content(s) = n,
(3) list(s) = (0 .. dec(dec(data(s)))) ∧ data(s) = succ(n)
∧¬(content(s) = n),
(4) ¬(list(s) = (0 .. dec(dec(data(s))))).
The operator succ is the successor function of natural numbers and the constant n denotes an arbitrary natural
number. Therefore, succ(n) denotes an arbitrary positive natural number. The proof of subcase (1) needs inv3(s)
to strengthen the inductive hypothesis, that of subcase (3) needs inv4(s) to strengthen the inductive hypothesis, and
those of the remaining two subcases do not need to strengthen the inductive hypotheses.
We show the proof passage of subcase (3), which is as follows:
open ISTEP
-- arbitrary objects
op n : -> Nat .
-- assumptions
eq empty(s) = false .
--
eq list(s) = (0 .. dec(dec(data(s)))) .
eq data(s) = succ(n) .
eq (content(s) = n) = false .
-- successor state
eq s’ = rec(s) .
-- check
red inv4(s) implies istep1 .
close
The first equation says that the effective condition of rec holds in s. The next three equations characterize the subcase.
inv4(s) implies istep1 is logically equivalent to (inv4(s) and inv1(s)) implies inv1(s’). inv4(s)
corresponds to SIHi in Section 4.2 and strengthens the basic induction hypothesis inv1(s). The result obtained by
rewriting inv4(s) implies istep1 is true, which means that the proof of the subcase has succeeded.
5.2. Fischer’s protocol
Fischer’s protocol is a real-time mutual exclusion protocol among multiple processes. Let P be a data type of
process IDs. The program executed by a process i ∈ P repeatedly can be written as follows:
a: Remainder Section [0,∞]
loop
b: repeat until turn = 0 [0,∞]
c: turn := i [0, d1]
d: if turn = i then break [d2,∞]
cs:Critical Section [0,∞]
e: turn := 0 [0,∞]
Initially turn is set to 0 and every process is at location a. [0, d1] forces process i to execute turn := i between 0
and d1 time units after the process gets to location c, and any other pair specifies a similar timing constraint. We also
suppose that 0 < d1 < d2 <∞.
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We model the system in which processes execute the program as a TOTS. Let L be a data type of locations such as
a and b used in the program. We first describe the OTS part of the TOTS, which uses two observers and six transitions,
which are as follows:
• Observers.
. turn : Υ → P returns the value of variable turn.
. loci : Υ → L returns the location at which process i is, where i ∈ P .• Transitions.
. tryi : Υ → Υ denotes that process i starts executing the program, where i ∈ P .
. testi : Υ → Υ denotes that process i executes one iteration of the loop at location b, where i ∈ P .
. seti : Υ → Υ denotes that process i executes the command at location c, where i ∈ P .
. checki : Υ → Υ denotes that process i executes the command at local d, where i ∈ P .
. exiti : Υ → Υ denotes that process i leaves the critical section, where i ∈ P .
. reseti : Υ → Υ denotes that process i executes the command at location c and goes back to location a, where
i ∈ P .
We next describe the timing-related part of the TOTS. Since the minimum and maximum delays of tryi , testi , exiti
and reseti are 0 and∞, the clocks that return their lower and upper bounds are omitted. Besides, the minimum delay
of seti is 0 and the maximum delay of checki is ∞. Therefore, lseti and uchecki are also omitted. As shown in the
program, the maximum delay of seti is d1 and the minimum delay of checki is d2. In addition to the master clock,
therefore, two clocks useti and lchecki are used, where i ∈ P .
The TOTS is written in CafeOBJ. The signature of the CafeOBJ specification is as follows:
*[ Sys ]*
-- an arbitrary initial state
op init : -> Sys
-- observation operators
bop turn : Sys -> Pid+
bop loc : Sys Pid -> Loc
bop now : Sys -> Real+
bop l : Sys Pid -> Real+
bop u : Sys Pid -> NzTimeval
-- action operators
bop try : Sys Pid -> Sys
bop test : Sys Pid -> Sys
bop set : Sys Pid -> Sys
bop check : Sys Pid -> Sys
bop exit : Sys Pid -> Sys
bop reset : Sys Pid -> Sys
bop tick : Sys Real+ -> Sys
Sys is a hidden sort denoting the state space Υ . Pid and Loc are visible sorts denoting P and L . Pid+ is a visible sort
denoting the data type obtained by adding an extra value that is not in P , which is denoted by the constant nop, into P .
The hidden constant init denotes an arbitrary initial state of the TOTS. l and u denote lchecki and useti , respectively.
The remaining observation and action operators denote the observers and transitions whose names are very similar to
those of the observation and action operators.
In the following, let S, I and J be CafeOBJ variables whose sorts are Sys, Pid and Pid, respectively. The equations
defining init are as follows:
eq turn(init) = nop .
eq loc(init,I) = a .
eq now(init) = 0 .
eq l(init,I) = 0 .
eq u(init,I) = oo .
The constant a denotes location a.
176 K. Ogata, K. Futatsugi / Science of Computer Programming 66 (2007) 162–180
For each action operator, we have a set of equations defining the action operator. In this paper, we show the
equations defining check, which are as follows:
op c-check : Sys Pid -> Bool
eq c-check(S,I) = (loc(S,I) = d and l(S,I) <= now(S)) .
--
eq turn(check(S,I)) = turn(S) .
ceq loc(check(S,I),J)
= (if I = J then (if turn(S) = I then cs else b fi)
else loc(S,J) fi) if c-check(S,I) .
eq now(check(S,I)) = now(S) .
ceq l(check(S,I),J)
= (if I = J then 0 else l(S,J) fi) if c-check(S,I) .
eq u(check(S,I),J) = u(S,J) .
ceq check(S,I) = S if not c-check(S,I) .
The operator c-check denotes the effective condition of checki .
We verify that there exists at most one process at location cs at any given time. To this end, all we have to do is to
prove the following predicate invariant to the TOTS:
loci (υ) = cs ∧ loc j (υ) = cs⇒ i = j. (9)
To prove (9) invariant to the TOTS, we need to prove the following predicates invariant to the TOTS:
loci (υ) = d ∧ turn(υ) = i ∧ loc j (υ) = c ∧ ¬(i = j)⇒ uchecki < lseti , (10)
loci (υ) = c⇒ uchecki < now(υ)+ d2, (11)
loci (υ) = cs ∨ loci (υ) = e ∧ ¬(i = j)⇒ turn(υ) = i ∧ ¬(loc j (υ) = c), (12)
now(υ) ≤ uchecki . (13)
(10), (11), (12) and (10) are proved invariant to the TOTS by simultaneous induction on the number of transitions
applied by writing proof scores in CafeOBJ. (9) is proved invariant to the TOTS by rewriting and case analysis, which
uses (12), by writing a proof score in CafeOBJ.
Before writing proof scores, we first write a module, say INV, in which the five predicates are expressed as CafeOBJ
terms as follows:
op inv1 : Sys Pid Pid -> Bool
op inv2 : Sys Pid Pid -> Bool
op inv3 : Sys Pid -> Bool
op inv4 : Sys Pid Pid -> Bool
op inv5 : Sys Pid -> Bool
eq inv1(S,I,J)
= (loc(S,I) = cs and loc(S,J) = cs implies I = J) .
eq inv2(S,I,J)
= (loc(S,I) = d and turn(S) = I and loc(S,J) = c
and not(I = J)
implies
u(S,J) < l(S,I)) .
eq inv3(S,I) = (loc(S,I) = c implies u(S,I) < now(S) + d2) .
eq inv4(S,I,J)
= (loc(S,I) = cs or loc(S,I) = e and not(I = J)
implies
turn(S) = I and not(loc(S,J) = c)) .
eq inv5(S,I) = now(S) <= u(S,I) .
In the module INV, constants i and j of Pid are declared, denoting arbitrary process IDs.
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We next write a module, say ISTEP, in which basic formulas to prove in each inductive case are expressed as
CafeOBJ terms as follows:
op istep2 : Pid Pid -> Bool
op istep3 : Pid -> Bool
op istep4 : Pid Pid -> Bool
op istep5 : Pid -> Bool
eq istep2(I,J) = inv2(s,I,J) implies inv2(s’,I,J) .
eq istep3(I) = inv3(s,I) implies inv3(s’,I) .
eq istep4(I,J) = inv4(s,I,J) implies inv4(s’,I,J) .
eq istep5(I) = inv5(s,I) implies inv5(s’,I) .
The constants s and s’ denote an arbitrary state and a successor state of the state. The constants are declared in the
module ISTEP.
We then write five proof scores of (9), (10), (11), (12) and (13). In this paper, we partly describe the proof scores
of (9) and (12).
To prove (9), the case is split into the four subcases characterized by the following four predicates:
(1) loc(s,i) = cs ∧ loc(s,j) = cs ∧ turn(s) = i,
(2) loc(s,i) = cs ∧ loc(s,j) = cs ∧ ¬(turn(s) = i),
(3) ¬(loc(s,i) = cs),
(4) ¬(loc(s,j) = cs),
The proof of subcase (1) needs inv4(s,i,k) and inv4(s,j,k), that of subcase (2) needs inv4(s,i,k), and those
of the remaining two subcases need nothing.
We show the proof passage of subcase (1), which is as follows:
open INV
-- arbitrary objects
op s : -> Sys .
op k : -> Pid .
-- assumptions
eq loc(s,i) = cs .
eq loc(s,j) = cs .
eq turn(s) = i .
-- check
red inv4(s,i,k) and inv4(s,j,k) implies inv1(s,i,j) .
close
The result obtained by rewriting inv4(s,i,k) and inv4(s,j,k) implies inv1(s,i,j) is true, which means
that the proof of the subcase has succeeded.
We next describe the inductive case in which checkk for each k ∈ P , which is denoted by check, preserves (12).
When the effective condition of checkk holds, the case is split into the eight subcases characterized by the following
eight predicates:
(1) i = k ∧ j = k ∧ turn(s) = k,
(2) i = k ∧ j = k ∧ ¬(turn(s) = k),
(3) i = k ∧ ¬(j = k) ∧ turn(s) = k ∧ now(s) <= u(s,j),
(4) i = k ∧ ¬(j = k) ∧ turn(s) = k ∧ ¬(now(s) <= u(s,j)),
(5) i = k ∧ ¬(j = k) ∧ ¬(turn(s) = k),
(6) ¬(i = k) ∧ j = k ∧ turn(s) = k,
(7) ¬(i = k) ∧ j = k ∧ ¬(turn(s) = k),
(8) ¬(i = k) ∧ ¬(j = k),
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where the constant k corresponds to k. The proof of subcase (3) needs inv2(s, i,j) to strengthen the inductive
hypothesis, that of subcase (4) needs inv5(s, j) to strengthen the inductive hypothesis, and those of the remaining
six subcases do not need to strengthen the inductive hypotheses.
We show the proof passage of subcase (3), which is as follows:
open ISTEP
-- arbitrary objects
op k : -> Pid .
-- assumptions
-- eq c-check(s,k) = true .
eq loc(s,k) = d .
eq l(s,k) <= now(s) = true .
--
eq i = k .
eq (j = k) = false .
eq turn(s) = k .
eq now(s) <= u(s,j) = true .
-- facts
ceq (X:Timeval) <= (Y:Timeval) = true
if X <= now(s) and now(s) <= Y .
-- successor state
eq s’ = check(s,k) .
-- check
red inv2(s,i,j) implies istep4(i,j) .
close
Instead of declaring the equation c-check(s,k) = true, the two equations loc(s,k) = d and l(s,k) <=
now(s) = true are declared to assume that the effective condition holds in s. One reason is that c-check(s,k)
is not in normal form in the sense of term rewriting. Generally the left-hand side of an equation should be in normal
form to make effective use of the equation as a rewrite rule. The other reason is that the equation c-check(s,k) =
true can be deduced from the two equations, while the two equations cannot be deduced from the equation by means
of rewriting.
In this proof passage, an instance of the transitivity law of extended non-negative real numbers with respect to the
operator _<=_ is declared because the generic transitive law of extended non-negative real numbers with respect to the
operator _<=_ as an equation has a variable in the condition that does not appear in the left-hand side and the equation
is not automatically used as a left-to-right rewrite rule. The generic transitive law can be written as an equation as
follows:
ceq X <= Y = true if X <= Z and Z <= Y .
The CafeOBJ variable Z appears in the condition but does appear in the left-hand side.
The result obtained by rewriting inv2(s,i,j) implies istep4(i,j) is true, which means that the proof of the
subcase has succeeded.
6. Related work
Alur–Dill timed automata [16] are finite ω-automata such that state transitions are annotated by timing constraints
using real-valued clocks. A timed automaton accepts timed words that are infinite sequences in which a real-valued
time of occurrence is associated with each symbol. The verification that a finite-state real-time system (modeled by
a product A of timed automata) meets a specification (described as a deterministic timed automaton AS) is done by
checking if any timed word accepted by A is also a timed word accepted by AS , which can be done automatically.
Although it may be impossible to fully automate verification of general TOTSs with the CafeOBJ system, TOTSs
can be used to model and reason about infinite-state real-time systems. Besides, to model a real-time system as
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a timed automaton, you should identify all the states involved in the real-time system in advance, which may be
difficult. You do not have to explicitly identify states involved in a real-time system in advance to model the system as
a TOTS.
Abadi and Lamport [15] describe a way of specifying and reasoning about real-time systems with traditional
methods for specifying and reasoning about concurrent systems, which is called the old-fashioned recipe. The basic
idea is to introduce real-valued variables to represent clocks. TLA [17] (the temporal logic of actions) is used to
describe the old-fashioned recipe, which is also applied to two case studies: the lossy-queue and Fischer’s protocol.
TOTSs are largely inspired by the old-fashioned recipe and can be seen as one successful application of the old-
fashioned recipe. Since equations are easier to understand than temporal logic formulas, however, our method has the
advantage of understandability. The asynchronous data sending is a simplified version of the lossy-queue.
Maude [18,19] is also a member of the family of OBJ languages as CafeOBJ. Maude can be used to specify real-
time systems [20], and search all the reachable states from an initial state if the reachable states are finite [21].
The main difference between our approach and that using Maude is that the former can be applied to real-time
systems whose (reachable) state spaces are infinite, while the latter can analyze real-time systems automatically
if their reachable state spaces are finite (precisely small enough). Therefore, we can say that both approaches are
complementary.
Behavioral specifications are algebraic specifications of abstract machines, whose theoretical foundation is hidden
algebra [1,2]. CafeOBJ specifications of (T)OTSs reside in a subclass of behavioral specifications. The behavioral
equivalence on states of (a CafeOBJ specification of) a (T)OTS is given by the definition (see Definition 1), while for
a general behavioral specification basically a candidate relation should be conjectured and proved to be a hidden
congruence by coinduction [1,2] in order to check if two states are behaviorally equivalent. Several tools have
been proposed to support analysis of behavioral specifications. BOBJ [22] is another member of the family of OBJ
languages, equipped with a mechanism that automates proofs that properties hold for behavioral specifications to
some extent. Lucanu and Ciobanu [23] have proposed a methodology with which behavioral specifications (written in
BOBJ) are translated into SMV specifications so that behavioral specifications can be model-checked with SMV [24].
Chocolat/SMV [25] translates CafeOBJ specifications of OTSs into SMV specifications, which are model-checked
with SMV. Given predicates for case splitting and necessary lemmas, Gateau [26] generates proof scores. Cre`me [27]
is an automatic invariant verification tool for behavioral specifications of OTSs. Cre`me can prove automatically that
authentication protocols such as the NSLPK protocol [28] have desired invariant properties. None of these tools,
however, has ever been used for analysis of real-time systems.
7. Conclusion
We have described TOTSs for specifying and reasoning about real-time systems. Two examples have been used
to demonstrate how to model real-time systems as TOTSs, specify TOTSs in CafeOBJ and verify that TOTSs have
properties with the CafeOBJ system.
In the two case studies described in this paper, all the proof scores haven been written by hand. Several
experiments [9,29–32] give evidence that it is not time-consuming to write proof scores by hand, which we think
can be applied to verification of real-time systems. It would be more convenient, however, to support verification of
real-time systems with some tools. Therefore, we are going to use Chocolat/SMV, Gateau and/or Cre`me for analysis
of real-time systems and modify them if necessary.
Although the proof score approach to verification can help users find flaws lurking in specifications [9,10], the
approach does not produce any counterexamples automatically. While writing proofs that a property holds for a
specification, we sometimes (or often) encounter a situation in which the proofs do not seem to succeed. There are
some possibilities that make us encounter such a situation: (1) there is a counterexample, namely that the property does
not hold for the specification, (2) conjectured lemmas are inappropriate, etc. If the first possibility is the cause, model
checking can save time. That is why we have developed Chocolat/SMV. Maude is a more appropriate specification
language into which CafeOBJ specifications are translated than languages for other existing model checkers such as
SMV because users can define data types flexibly in Maude as in CafeOBJ and Maude can be used to specify real-
time systems. Therefore, we have been developing a translator that takes a CafeOBJ specification of a (T)OTS and
generates a corresponding Maude specification that can be model-checked [33].
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